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Current models of visual perception typically assume that human vision estimates true
properties of physical objects, properties that exist even if unperceived. However, recent
studies of perceptual evolution, using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms, reveal
that natural selection often drives true perceptions to extinction when they compete
with perceptions tuned to fitness rather than truth: Perception guides adaptive behavior;
it does not estimate a preexisting physical truth. Moreover, shifting from evolutionary
biology to quantum physics, there is reason to disbelieve in preexisting physical truths:
Certain interpretations of quantum theory deny that dynamical properties of physical
objects have definite values when unobserved. In some of these interpretations the
observer is fundamental, and wave functions are compendia of subjective probabilities,
not preexisting elements of physical reality. These two considerations, from evolutionary
biology and quantum physics, suggest that current models of object perception require
fundamental reformulation. Here we begin such a reformulation, starting with a formal
model of consciousness that we call a “conscious agent.” We develop the dynamics of
interacting conscious agents, and study how the perception of objects and space-time
can emerge from such dynamics. We show that one particular object, the quantum free
particle, has a wave function that is identical in form to the harmonic functions that
characterize the asymptotic dynamics of conscious agents; particles are vibrations not of
strings but of interacting conscious agents. This allows us to reinterpret physical properties
such as position, momentum, and energy as properties of interacting conscious agents,
rather than as preexisting physical truths. We sketch how this approach might extend to
the perception of relativistic quantum objects, and to classical objects of macroscopic
scale.
Keywords: consciousness, quantum theory, Markov chains, combination problem, geometric algebra
INTRODUCTION
The human mind is predisposed to believe that physical objects,
when unperceived, still exist with definite shapes and locations
in space. The psychologist Piaget proposed that children start to
develop this belief in “object permanence” around 9 months of
age, and have it firmly entrenched just 9 months later (Piaget,
1954). Further studies suggest that object permanence starts as
early as 3 months of age (Bower, 1974; Baillargeon and DeVos,
1991).
Belief in object permanence remains firmly entrenched into
adulthood, even in the brightest of minds. Abraham Pais said of
Einstein, “We often discussed his notions on objective reality. I
recall that on one walk Einstein suddenly stopped, turned to me
and asked whether I really believed that the moon exists only
when I look at it” (Pais, 1979). Einstein was troubled by inter-
pretations of quantum theory that entail that the moon does not
exist when unperceived.
Belief in object permanence underlies physicalist theories of
the mind-body problem. When Gerald Edelman claimed, for
instance, that “There is now a vast amount of empirical evi-
dence to support the idea that consciousness emerges from the
organization and operation of the brain” he assumed that the
brain exists when unperceived (Edelman, 2004). When Francis
Crick asserted the “astonishing hypothesis” that “You’re noth-
ing but a pack of neurons” he assumed that neurons exist when
unperceived (Crick, 1994).
Object permanence underlies the standard account of evo-
lution by natural selection. As James memorably put it, “The
point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is
that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are
really nothing more than results of the redistribution of the
original and unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which,
chaotically dispersed, made the nebula, now, jammed and tem-
porarily caught in peculiar positions, form our brains” (James,
1890). Evolutionary theory, in the standard account, assumes that
atoms, and the replicating molecules that they form, exist when
unperceived.
Object permanence underlies computational models of the
visual perception of objects. David Marr, for instance, claimed
“We . . . very definitely do compute explicit properties of the
real visible surfaces out there, and one interesting aspect of the
evolution of visual systems is the gradual movement toward the
difficult task of representing progressively more objective aspects
of the visual world” (Marr, 1982). For Marr, objects and their
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surfaces exist when unperceived, and human vision has evolved
to describe their objective properties.
Bayesian theories of vision assume object permanence. They
model object perception as a process of statistical estimation of
object properties, such as surface shape and reflectance, that exist
when unperceived. As Alan Yuille and Heinrich Bülthoff put it,
“We define vision as perceptual inference, the estimation of scene
properties from an image or sequence of images . . . ” (Yuille and
Bülthoff, 1996).
There is a long and interesting history of debate about which
properties of objects exist when unperceived. Shape, size, and
position usually make the list. Others, such as taste and color,
often do not. Democritus, a contemporary of Socrates, famously
claimed, “by convention sweet and by convention bitter, by con-
vention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in
reality atoms and void” (Taylor, 1999).
Locke proposed that “primary qualities” of objects, such as
“bulk, figure, or motion” exist when unperceived, but that “sec-
ondary properties” of objects, such as “colors and smells” do not.
He then claimed that “. . . the ideas of primary qualities of bod-
ies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist
in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these
secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all” (Locke,
1690).
Philosophical and scientific debate continues to this day on
whether properties such as color exist when unperceived (Byrne
and Hilbert, 2003; Hoffman, 2006). But object permanence, cer-
tainly regarding shape and position, is so deeply assumed by the
scientific literature in the fields of psychophysics and computa-
tional perception that it is rarely discussed.
It is also assumed in the scientific study of consciousness and
the mind-body problem. Here the widely acknowledged failure
to create a plausible theory forces reflection on basic assump-
tions, including object permanence. But few researchers in fact
give it up. To the contrary, the accepted view is that aspects
of neural dynamics—from quantum-gravity induced collapses
of wavefunctions at microtubules (Hameroff, 1998) to informa-
tional properties of re-entrant thalamo-cortical loops (Tononi,
2004)—cause, or give rise to, or are identical to, conscious-
ness. As Colin McGinn puts it, “we know that brains are the
de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems,
no understanding whatever of how this can be so” (McGinn,
1989).
EVOLUTION AND PERCEPTION
The human mind is predisposed from early childhood to assume
object permanence, to assume that objects have shapes and posi-
tions in space even when the objects and space are unperceived. It
is reasonable to ask whether this assumption is a genuine insight
into the nature of objective reality, or simply a habit that is
perhaps useful but not necessarily insightful.
We can look to evolution for an answer. If we assume that
our perceptual and cognitive capacities have been shaped, at least
in part, by natural selection, then we can use formal models of
evolution, such as evolutionary game theory (Lieberman et al.,
2005; Nowak, 2006) and genetic algorithms (Mitchell, 1998), to
explore if, and under what circumstances, natural selection favors
perceptual representations that are genuine insights into the true
nature of the objective world.
Evaluating object permanence on evolutionary grounds might
seem quixotic, or at least unfair, given that we just noted that
evolutionary theory, as it’s standardly described, assumes object
permanence (e.g., of DNA and the physical bodies of organisms).
How then could one possibly use evolutionary theory to test what
it assumes to be true?
However, Richard Dawkins and others have observed that the
core of evolution by natural selection is an abstract algorithm
with three key components: variation, selection, and retention
(Dennett, 1995; Blackmore, 1999). This abstract algorithm con-
stitutes a “universal Darwinism” that need not assume object
permanence and can be profitably applied in many contexts
beyond biological evolution. Thus, it is possible, without beg-
ging the question, to use formal models of evolution by natural
selection to explore whether object permanence is an insight
or not.
Jerry Fodor has criticized the theory of natural selection itself,
arguing, for instance, that it impales itself with an intensional fal-
lacy, viz., inferring from the premise that “evolution is a process
in which creatures with adaptive traits are selected” to the conclu-
sion that “evolution is a process in which creatures are selected
for their adaptive traits” (Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010).
However, Fodor’s critique seems wide of the mark (Futuyma,
2010) and the evidence for evolution by natural selection is
overwhelming (Coyne, 2009; Dawkins, 2009).
What, then, do we find when we explore the evolution of
perception using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms?
The standard answer, at least among vision scientists, is that we
should find that natural selection favors veridical perceptions,
i.e., perceptions that accurately represent objective properties of
the external world that exist when unperceived. Steven Palmer,
for instance, in a standard graduate-level textbook, states that
“Evolutionarily speaking, visual perception is useful only if it is
reasonably accurate . . . Indeed, vision is useful precisely because it
is so accurate. By and large,what you see is what you get.When this
is true, we have what is called veridical perception . . . perception
that is consistent with the actual state of affairs in the environ-
ment. This is almost always the case with vision . . . ” (Palmer,
1999).
The argument, roughly, is that those of our predecessors whose
perceptions were more veridical had a competitive advantage
over those whose perceptions were less veridical. Thus, the genes
that coded for more veridical perceptions were more likely to
propagate to the next generation. We are, with good probability,
the offspring of those who, in each succeeding generation, per-
ceived more truly, and thus we can be confident that our own
perceptions are, in the normal case, veridical.
The conclusion that natural selection favors veridical percep-
tions is central to current Bayesianmodels of perception, in which
perceptual systems use Bayesian inference to estimate true prop-
erties of the objective world, properties such as shape, position,
motion, and reflectance (Knill and Richards, 1996; Geisler and
Diehl, 2003). Objects exist and have these properties when unper-
ceived, and the function of perception is to accurately estimate
pre-existing properties.
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However, when we actually study the evolution of perception
usingMonte Carlo simulations of evolutionary games and genetic
algorithms, we find that natural selection does not, in general,
favor perceptions that are true reports of objective properties of
the environment. Instead, it generally favors perceptual strategies
that are tuned to fitness (Mark et al., 2010; Hoffman et al., 2013;
Marion, 2013; Mark, 2013).
Why? Several principles emerge from the simulations. First,
there is no free information. For every bit of information one
obtains about the external world, one must pay a price in energy,
e.g., in calories expended to obtain, process and retain that infor-
mation. And for every calorie expended in perception, one must
go out and kill something and eat it to get that calorie. So
natural selection tends to favor perceptual systems that, ceteris
paribus, use fewer calories. One way to use fewer calories is
to see less truth, especially truth that is not informative about
fitness.
Second, for every bit of information one obtains about the
external world, one must pay a price in time. More information
requires, in general, more time to obtain and process. But in the
real world where predators are on the prowl and prey must be
wary, the race is often to the swift. It is the slower gazelle that
becomes lunch for the swifter cheetah. So natural selection tends
to favor perceptual systems that, ceteris paribus, take less time.
One way to take less time is, again, to see less truth, especially
truth that is not informative about fitness.
Third, in a world where organisms are adapted to niches and
require homeostatic mechanisms, the fitness functions guiding
their evolution are generally not monotonic functions of struc-
tures or quantities in the world. Too much salt or too little can
be devastating; something in between is just right for fitness. The
same goldilocks principle can hold for water, altitude, humidity,
and so on. In these cases, perceptions that are tuned to fitness are
ipso facto not tuned to the true structure of the world, because the
two are not monotonically related; knowing the truth is not just
irrelevant, it can be inimical, to fitness.
Fourth, in the generic case where noise and uncertainty are
endemic to the perceptual process, a strategy that estimates a true
state of the world and then uses the utility associated to that state
to govern its decisions must throw away valuable information
about utility. It will in general be driven to extinction by a strategy
that does not estimate the true state of the world, and instead uses
all the information about utility (Marion, 2013).
Fifth, more complex perceptual systems are more difficult to
evolve. Monte Carlo simulations of genetic algorithms show that
there is a combinatorial explosion in the complexity of the search
required to evolve more complex perceptual systems. This com-
binatorial explosion itself is a selection pressure toward simpler
perceptual systems.
In short, natural selection does not favor perceptual systems
that see the truth in whole or in part. Instead, it favors per-
ceptions that are fast, cheap, and tailored to guide behaviors
needed to survive and reproduce. Perception is not about truth,
it’s about having kids. Genes coding for perceptual systems that
increase the probability of having kids are ipso facto the genes
that are more likely to code for perceptual systems in the next
generation.
THE INTERFACE THEORY OF PERCEPTION
Natural selection favors perceptions that are useful though not
true. This might seem counterintuitive, even to experts in percep-
tion. Palmer, for instance, in the quote above, makes the plausible
claim that “vision is useful precisely because it is so accurate”
(Palmer, 1999). Geisler and Diehl agree, taking it as obvious that
“In general, (perceptual) estimates that are nearer the truth have
greater utility than those that are wide of the mark” (Geisler and
Diehl, 2002). Feldman also takes it as obvious that “it is clearly
desirable (say from an evolutionary point of view) for an organ-
ism to achieve veridical percepts of the world” (Feldman, 2013).
Knill and Richards concur that vision “. . . involves the evolu-
tion of an organism’s visual system to match the structure of the
world . . . ” (Knill and Richards, 1996).
This assumption that perceptions are useful to the extent that
they are true is prima facie plausible, and it comports well with the
assumption of object permanence. For if our perceptions report
to us a three-dimensional world containing objects with specific
shapes and positions, and if these perceptual reports have been
shaped by evolution to be true, then we can be confident that
those objects really do, in the normal case, exist and have their
positions and shapes even when unperceived.
So we find it plausible that perceptions are useful only if true,
and we find it deeply counterintuitive to think otherwise. But
studies with evolutionary games and genetic algorithms flatly
contradict this deeply held assumption. Clearly our intuitions
need a little help here. How can we try to understand perceptions
that are useful but not true?
Fortunately, developments in computer technology have pro-
vided a convenient and helpful metaphor: the desktop of a win-
dows interface (Hoffman, 1998, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013;Mausfeld,
2002; Koenderink, 2011a; Hoffman and Singh, 2012; Singh and
Hoffman, 2013). Suppose you are editing a text file and that the
icon for that file is a blue rectangle sitting in the lower left corner
of the desktop. If you click on that icon you can open the file and
revise its text. If you drag that icon to the trash, you can delete the
file. If you drag it to the icon for an external hard drive, you can
create a backup of the file. So the icon is quite useful.
But is it true? Well, the only visible properties of the icon are its
position, shape, and color. Do these properties of the icon resem-
ble the true properties of the file? Clearly not. The file is not blue
or rectangular, and it’s probably not in the lower left corner of the
computer. Indeed, files don’t have a color or shape, and needn’t
have a well-defined position (e.g., the bits of the file could be
spread widely over memory). So to even ask if the properties of
the icon are true is to make a category error, and to completely
misunderstand the purpose of the interface. One can reasonably
ask whether the icon is usefully related to the file, but not whether
it truly resembles the file.
Indeed, a critical function of the interface is to hide the truth.
Most computer users don’t want to see the complexity of the inte-
grated circuits, voltages, and magnetic fields that are busy behind
the scenes when they edit a file. If they had to deal with that
complexity, they might never finish their work on the file. So
the interface is designed to allow the user to interact effectively
with the computer while remaining largely ignorant of its true
architecture.
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Ignorant, also, of its true causal structure. When a user drags
a file icon to an icon of an external drive, it looks obvious that
the movement of the file icon to the drive icon causes the file to
be copied. But this is just a useful fiction. The movement of the
file icon causes nothing in the computer. It simply serves to guide
the user’s operation of a mouse, triggering a complex chain of
causal events inside the computer, completely hidden from the
user. Forcing the user to see the true causal chain would be an
impediment, not a help.
Turning now to apply the interface metaphor to human per-
ception, the idea is that natural selection has not shaped our per-
ceptions to be insights into the true structure and causal nature
of objective reality, but has instead shaped our perceptions to be
a species-specific user interface, fashioned to guide the behav-
iors that we need to survive and reproduce. Space and time are
the desktop of our perceptual interface, and three-dimensional
objects are icons on that desktop.
Our interface gives the impression that it reveals true cause and
effect relations. When one billiard ball hits a second, it certainly
looks as though the first causes the second to careen away. But this
appearance of cause and effect is simply a useful fiction, just as it
is for the icons on the computer desktop.
There is an obvious rejoinder: “If that cobra is just an icon of
your interface with no causal powers, why don’t you grab it by the
tail?” The answer is straightforward: “I don’t grab the cobra for
the same reason I don’t carelessly drag my file icon to the trash—I
could lose a lot of work. I don’t take my icons literally: The file,
unlike its icon, is not literally blue or rectangular. But I do take
my icons seriously.”
Similarly, evolution has shaped us with a species-specific inter-
face whose icons we must take seriously. If there is a cliff, don’t
step over. If there is a cobra, don’t grab its tail. Natural selection
has endowed us with perceptions that function to guide adaptive
behaviors, and we ignore them at our own peril.
But, given that we must take our perceptions seriously, it does
not follow that we must take them literally. Such an inference is
natural, in the sense that most of us, even the brightest, make it
automatically.When Samuel Johnson heard Berkeley’s theory that
“To be is to be perceived” he kicked a stone and said, “I refute it
thus!” (Boswell, 1986) Johnson observed that one must take the
stone seriously or risk injury. From this Johnson concluded that
one must take the stone literally. But this inference is fallacious.
Onemight object that there still is an important sense in which
our perceptual icon of, say, a cobra does resemble the true objec-
tive reality: The consequences for an observer of grabbing the tail
of the cobra are precisely the consequences that would obtain if
the objective reality were in fact a cobra. Perceptions and internal
information-bearing structures are useful for fitness-preserving
or enhancing behavior because there is some mutual information
between the predicted utility of a behavior (like escaping) and its
actual utility. If there’s no mutual information and nomechanism
for increasing mutual information, fitness is low and stays that
way. Here we use mutual information in the sense of standard
information theory (Cover and Thomas, 2006).
This point is well-taken. Our perceptual icons do give us gen-
uine information about fitness, and fitness can be considered an
aspect of objective reality. Indeed, in Gibson’s ecological theory of
perception, our perceptions primarily resonate to “affordances,”
those aspects of the objective world that have important con-
sequences for fitness (Gibson, 1979). While we disagree with
Gibon’s direct realism and denial of information processing in
perception, we agree with his emphasis on the tuning of percep-
tion to fitness.
So we must clarify the relationship between truth and fitness.
In evolutionary theory it is as follows. If W denotes the objec-
tive world then, for a fixed organism, state, and action, we can
think of a fitness function to be a function f :W → [0,1], which
assigns to each state w of W a fitness value f (w). If, for instance,
the organism is a hungry cheetah and the action is eating, then f
might assign a high fitness value to world state w in which fresh
raw meat is available; but if the organism is a hungry cow then f
might assign a low fitness value to the same state w.
If the true probabilities of states in the world are given by a
probability measurem onW, then one can define a new probabil-
ity measuremf onW, where for any eventA ofW,mf (A) is simply
the integral of f over A with respect to m; mf must of course be
normalized so thatmf (W) = 1.
And here is the key point. A perceptual system that is tuned
to maximize the mutual information with m will not, in gen-
eral, maximize mutual information withmf (Cover and Thomas,
2006). Being tuned to truth, i.e., maximizing mutual information
with m, is not the same as being tuned to fitness, i.e., maximiz-
ing mutual information withmf. Indeed, depending on the fitness
function f, a perceptual system tuned to truth might carry little or
no information about fitness, and vice versa. It is in this sense that
the interface theory of perception claims that our perceptions are
tuned to fitness rather than truth.
There is another rejoinder: “The interface metaphor is noth-
ing new. Physicists have told us for more than a century that
solid objects are really mostly empty space. So an apparently solid
stone isn’t the true reality, but its atoms and subatomic particles
are.” Physicists have indeed said this since Rutherford published
his theory of the atomic nucleus in 1911 (Rutherford, 1911). But
the interface metaphor says something more radical. It says that
space and time themselves are just a desktop, and that anything
in space and time, including atoms and subatomic particles, are
themselves simply icons. It’s not just the moon that isn’t there
when one doesn’t look, it’s the atoms, leptons and quarks them-
selves that aren’t there. Object permanence fails for microscopic
objects just as it does for macroscopic.
This claim is, to contemporary sensibilities, radical. But there
is a perspective on the intellectual evolution of humanity over the
last few centuries for which the interface theory seems a natural
next step. According to this perspective, humanity has gradually
been letting go of the false belief that the way H. sapiens sees the
world is an insight into objective reality.
Many ancient cultures, including the pre-Socratic Greeks,
believed the world was flat, for the obvious reason that it looks
that way. Aristotle became persuaded, on empirical grounds, that
the earth is spherical, and this view gradually spread to other cul-
tures. Reality, we learned, departed in important respects from
some of our perceptions.
But then a geocentric model of the universe, in which the earth
is at the center and everything revolves around it, still held sway.
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Why? Because that’s the way things look to our unaided percep-
tions. The earth looks like it’s not moving, and the sun, moon,
planets, and stars look like they circle a stationary earth. Not until
the work of Copernicus and Kepler did we recognize that once
again reality differs, in important respects, from our perceptions.
This was difficult to swallow. Galileo was forced to recant in the
Vatican basement, and Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake.
But we finally, and painfully, accepted the mismatch between our
perceptions and certain aspects of reality.
The interface theory entails that these first two steps were mere
warm up. The next step in the intellectual history of H. sapiens is
a big one. We must recognize that all of our perceptions of space,
time and objects no more reflect reality than does our perception
of a flat earth. It’s not just this or that aspect of our perceptions
that must be corrected, it is the entire framework of a space-time
containing objects, the fundamental organization of our percep-
tual systems, that must be recognized as a mere species-specific
mode of perception rather than an insight into objective reality.
By this time it should be clear that, if the arguments given here
are sound, then the current Bayesian models of object perception
needmore than tinkering around the edges, they need fundamen-
tal transformation. And this transformation will necessarily have
ramifications for scientific questions well-beyond the confines of
computational models of object perception.
One example is the mind-body problem. A theory in which
objects and space-time do not exist unperceived and do not have
causal powers, cannot propose that neurons—which by hypoth-
esis do not exist unperceived and do not have causal powers—
cause any of our behaviors or conscious experiences. This is so
contrary to contemporary thought in this field that it is likely to
be taken as a reductio of the view rather than as an alternative
direction of inquiry for a field that has yet to construct a plausible
theory.
DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUS AGENTS
If our reasoning has been sound, then space-time and three-
dimensional objects have no causal powers and do not exist
unperceived. Therefore, we need a fundamentally new foundation
from which to construct a theory of objects. Here we explore the
possibility that consciousness is that new foundation, and seek a
mathematically precise theory. The idea is that a theory of objects
requires, first, a theory of subjects.
This is, of course, a non-trivial endeavor. Frank Wilczek, when
discussing the interpretation of quantum theory, said, “The rel-
evant literature is famously contentious and obscure. I believe it
will remain so until someone constructs, within the formalism of
quantum mechanics, an “observer,” that is, a model entity whose
states correspond to a recognizable caricature of conscious aware-
ness . . . That is a formidable project, extending well-beyond what
is conventionally considered physics” (Wilczek, 2006).
The approach we take toward constructing a theory of con-
sciousness is similar to the approach Alan Turing took toward
constructing a theory of computation. Turing proposed a simple
but rigorous formalism, now called the Turing machine (Turing,
1937; Herken, 1988). It consists of six components: (1) a finite
set of states, (2) a finite set of symbols, (3) a special blank sym-
bol, (4) a finite set of input symbols, (5) a start state, (6) a set of
halt states, and (7) a finite set of simple transition rules (Hopcroft
et al., 2006).
Turing and others then conjectured that a function is algorith-
mically computable if and only if it is computable by a Turing
machine. This “Church-Turing Thesis” can’t be proven, but it
could in principle be falsified by a counterexample, e.g., by some
example of a procedure that everyone agreed was computable but
for which no Turing machine existed. No counterexample has yet
been found, and the Church-Turing thesis is considered secure,
even definitional.
Similarly, to construct a theory of consciousness we propose a
simple but rigorous formalism called a conscious agent, consisting
of six components. We then state the conscious agent thesis, which
claims that every property of consciousness can be represented
by some property of a conscious agent or system of interacting
conscious agents. The hope is to start with a small and simple
set of definitions and assumptions, and then to have a complete
theory of consciousness arise as a series of theorems and proofs
(or simulations, when complexity precludes proof). We want a
theory of consciousness qua consciousness, i.e., of consciousness
on its own terms, not as something derivative or emergent from a
prior physical world.
No doubt this approach will strike many as prima facie absurd.
It is a commonplace in cognitive neuroscience, for instance, that
most of our mental processes are unconscious processes (Bargh
and Morsella, 2008). The standard account holds that well more
than 90% of mental processes proceed without conscious aware-
ness. Therefore, the proposal that consciousness is fundamental
is, to contemporary thought, an amusing anachronism not worth
serious consideration.
This critique is apt. It’s clear frommany experiments that each
of us is indeed unaware of most of the mental processes underly-
ing our actions and conscious perceptions. But this is no surprise,
given the interface theory of perception. Our perceptual inter-
faces have been shaped by natural selection to guide, quickly and
cheaply, behaviors that are adaptive in our niche. They have not
been shaped to provide exhaustive insights into truth. In con-
sequence, our perceptions have endogenous limits to the range
and complexity of their representations. It was not adaptive to be
aware of most of our mental processing, just as it was not adaptive
to be aware of how our kidneys filter blood.
We must be careful not to assume that limitations of our
species-specific perceptions are insights into the true nature of
reality. My friend’s mind is not directly conscious to me, but that
does not entail that my friend is unconscious. Similarly, most of
my mental processes are not directly conscious to me, but that
does not entail that they are unconscious. Our perceptual sys-
tems have finite capacity, and will therefore inevitably simplify
and omit. We are well-advised not to mistake our omissions and
simplifications for insights into reality.
There are of course many other critiques of an approach
that takes consciousness to be fundamental: How can such an
approach explain matter, the fundamental forces, the Big Bang,
the genesis and structure of space-time, the laws of physics,
evolution by natural selection, and the many neural correlates
of consciousness? These are non-trivial challenges that must be
faced by the theory of conscious agents. But for the moment we
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will postpone them and develop the theory of conscious agents
itself.
Conscious agent is a technical term, with a precise mathemat-
ical definition that will be presented shortly. To understand the
technical term, it can be helpful to have some intuitions thatmoti-
vate the definition. The intuitions are just intuitions, and if they
don’t help they can be dropped. What does the heavy lifting is the
definition itself.
A key intuition is that consciousness involves three processes:
perception, decision, and action.
In the process of perception, a conscious agent interacts with
the world and, in consequence, has conscious experiences.
In the process of decision, a conscious agent chooses what
actions to take based on the conscious experiences it has.
In the process of action, the conscious agent interacts with the
world in light of the decision it has taken, and affects the state of
the world.
Another intuition is that we want to avoid unnecessarily
restrictive assumptions in constructing a theory of consciousness.
Our conscious visual experience of nearby space, for instance,
is approximately Euclidean. But it would be an unnecessary
restriction to require that all of our perceptual experiences be
represented by Euclidean spaces.
However it does seem necessary to discuss the probability of
having a conscious experience, of making a particular decision,
and of making a particular change in the world through action.
Thus, it seems necessary to assume that we can represent the
world, our conscious experiences, and our possible actions with
probability spaces.
We also want to avoid unnecessarily restrictive assumptions
about the processes of perception, decision, and action. We might
find, for instance, that a particular decision process maximizes
expected utility, or minimizes expected risk, or builds an explicit
model of the self. But it would be an unnecessary restriction to
require this of all decisions.
However, when considering the processes of perception, deci-
sion and action, it does seem necessary to discuss conditional
probability. It seems necessary, for instance, to discuss the con-
ditional probability of deciding to take a specific action given a
specific conscious experience, the conditional probability of a par-
ticular change in the world given that a specific action is taken,
and the conditional probability of a specific conscious experience
given a specific state of the world.
A general way to model such conditional probabilities is by
the mathematical formalism of Markovian kernels (Revuz, 1984).
One can think of a Markovian kernel as simply an indexed list
of probability measures. In the case of perception, for instance,
a Markovian kernel might specify that if the state of the world is
w1, then here is a list of the probabilities for the various conscious
experiences that might result, but if the state of the world is w2,
then here is a different list of the probabilities for the various con-
scious experiences that might result, and so on for all the possible
states of the world. AMarkovian kernel on a finite set of states can
be written as matrix in which the entries in each row sum to 1.
A Markovian kernel can also be thought of as an informa-
tion channel. Cover and Thomas, for instance, define “a discrete
channel to be a system consisting of an input alphabet X and
output alphabet Y and a probability transition matrix p(x|y) that
expresses the probability of observing the output symbol y given
that we send the symbol x” (Cover and Thomas, 2006). Thus, a
discrete channel is simply a Markovian kernel.
So, each time a conscious agent interacts with the world and,
in consequence, has a conscious experience, we can think of this
interaction as a message being passed from the world to the con-
scious agent over a channel. Similarly, each time the conscious
agent has a conscious experience and, in consequence, decides on
an action to take, we can think of this decision as a message being
passed over a channel within the conscious agent itself. And when
the conscious agent then takes the action and, in consequence,
alters the state of the world, we can think of this as a message
being passed from the conscious agent to the world over a chan-
nel. In the discrete case, we can keep track of the number of times
each channel is used. That is, we can count the number of mes-
sages that are passed over each channel. Assuming that all three
channels (perception, decision, action) all work in lock step, we
can use one counter, N, to keep track of the number of messages
that are passed.
These are some of the intuitions that underlie the definition
of conscious agent that we will present. These intuitions can be
represented pictorially in a diagram, as shown in Figure 1. The
channel P transmits messages from the world W, leading to con-
scious experiences X. The channel D transmits messages from X,
leading to actions G. The channel A transmits messages from G
that are received as new states of W. The counter N is an inte-
ger that keeps track of the number of messages that are passed on
each channel.
In what follows we will be using the notion of a measurable
space. Recall that a measurable space, (X, X), is a set X together
with a collectionX of subsets ofX, called events, that satisfies three
properties: (1) X is in X; (2)X is closed under complement (i.e., if
a set A is in X then the complement of A is also in X); and (3) X is
closed under countable union. The collection of events X is a σ -
algebra (Athreya and Lahiri, 2006). A probability measure assigns
a probability to each event in X.
With these intuitions, we now present the formal definition of
a conscious agent where, for the moment, we simply assume that
the world is a measurable space (W, W).
Definition 1. A conscious agent, C, is a six-tuple
C = ((X,X), (G,G), P,D,A,N)), (1)
where:
(1) (X, X) and (G, G) are measurable spaces;
(2) P : W × X → [0, 1], D: X × G → [0, 1], A: G × W → [0, 1]
are Markovian kernels; and
(3) N is an integer.
For convenience we will often write a conscious agent C as
C = (X,G, P,D,A,N), (2)
omitting the σ -algebras.
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FIGURE 1 | A diagram of a conscious agent. A conscious agent has six
components as illustrated here. The maps P, D, and A can be thought of as
communication channels.
Given that P, D, and A are channels, each has a channel
capacity, viz., a highest rate of bits per channel use, at which
information can be sent across the channel with arbitrarily low
chance of error (Cover and Thomas, 2006).
The formal structure of a conscious agent, like that of a Turing
machine, is simple. Nevertheless, we will propose, in the next sec-
tion, a “conscious-agent thesis” which, like the Church-Turing
thesis, claims wide application for the formalism.
CONSCIOUS REALISM
One glaring feature of the definition of a conscious agent is that
it involves the world, W. This is not an arbitrary choice; W is
required to define the perceptual map P and action map A of the
conscious agent.
This raises the question: What is the world? If we take it to be
the space-time world of physics, then the formalism of conscious
agents is dualistic, with some components (e.g., X and G) refer-
ring to consciousness and another, viz.,W, referring to a physical
world.
We want a non-dualistic theory. Indeed, the monism we
want takes consciousness to be fundamental. The formal-
ism of conscious agents provides a precise way to state this
monism.
Hypothesis 1. Conscious realism: The worldW consists entirely
of conscious agents.
Conscious realism is a precise hypothesis that, of course, might
be precisely wrong. We can explore its theoretical implications
in the normal scientific manner to see if they comport well with
FIGURE 2 | Two conscious agents, C1 and C2. Each is part of the world W
for the other conscious agent. The lower part of the diagram represents C1
and the upper part represents C2. This creates an undirected combination
of C1 and C2, a concept we define in section The Combination Problem.
existing data and theories, and make predictions that are novel,
interesting and testable.
TWO CONSCIOUS AGENTS
Conscious realism can be expressed mathematically in a simple
form. Consider the elementary case, in which the worldW of one
conscious agent,
C1 = (X1,G1, P1,D1,A1,N1), (3)
contains just C1 and one other agent,
C2 = (X2,G2, P2,D2,A2,N2), (4)
and vice versa. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Observe that although W is the world it cannot properly be
called, in this example, the external world of C1 or of C2 because
C1 and C2 are each part ofW. This construction ofW requires the
compatibility conditions
P1 = A2, (5)
P2 = A1, (6)
N1 = N2. (7)
These conditions mean that the perceptions of one conscious
agent are identical to the actions of the other, and that their coun-
ters are synchronized. To understand this, recall that we can think
of P1, P2, A1, and A2 as information channels. So interpreted, con-
ditions (5) and (6) state that the action channel of one agent is
the same information channel as the perception channel of the
other agent. Condition (7) states that the channels of both agents
operate in synchrony.
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FIGURE 3 | Two adjacent conscious agents, C1 and C2. Each agent
receives messages from the other (indicated by the concave receivers) and
sends messages to the other (indicated by the semicircular transmitters).
Arrows show the direction of information flow.
If two conscious agents C1 and C2 satisfy the commuting dia-
gram of Figure 2, then we say that they are joined or adjacent: the
experiences and actions of C1 affect the probabilities of experi-
ences and actions for C2 and vice versa. Figure 3 illustrates the
ideas so far.
We can simplify the diagrams further and simply write C1—C2
to represent two adjacent conscious agents.
THREE CONSCIOUS AGENTS
Any number of conscious agents can be joined. Consider the case
of three conscious agents,
Ci = (Xi,Gi, Pi,Di,Ai,Ni), i = 1, 2, 3. (8)
This is illustrated in Figure 4, and compactly in Figure 5.
Because C1 interacts with C2 and C3, its perceptions are
affected by both C2 and C3. Thus, its perception kernel,
P1, must reflect the inputs of C2 and C3. We write it as
follows:
P1 = P12 ⊗ P13 : (G2 × G3) × X1 → [0, 1], (9)
where
X1 = σ (X12 × X13), (10)
(X12, X12) is the measurable space of perceptions that C1 can
receive from C2, and (X13, X13) is the measurable space of
perceptions that C1 can receive from C3, and σ (X12 × X13)
denotes the σ -algebra generated by the Cartesian product of




(g2, g3), (x12, x13)
) = P12(g2, x12)P13(g3, x13), (11)
where g2 ∈ G2, g3 ∈ G3, x12 ∈ X12, and x13 ∈ X13. Note that (11)
allows that the perceptions that C1 gets from C2 could be entirely
different from those it gets from C3, and expresses the probabilis-
tic independence of these perceptual inputs. In general, X12 need
not be identical to X13, since the kinds of perceptions that C1 can
FIGURE 4 | Three adjacent conscious agents. The third agent is
replicated at the top and bottom of the diagram for visual simplicity.
receive from C2 need not be the same as the kinds of perceptions
that C1 can receive from C3.
Because C1 interacts with C2 and C3, its actions affect both.
However, the way C1 acts on C2 might differ from how it acts on
C3, and the definition of its action kernel, A1, must allow for this
difference of action. Therefore, we define the action kernel, A1, to
be the tensor product
A1 = A12 ⊗ A13 : G1 × σ (X2 × X3) → [0, 1], (12)
where
G1 = G12 × G13, (13)
(G12, G12) is the measurable space of actions that C1 can take on
C2, and (G13, G13) is the measurable space of actions that C1 can
take on C3.
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FIGURE 5 | Three adjacent conscious agents. This is a compact
representation of the diagram in Figure 4.
FIGURE 6 | Three conscious agents whose graph is complete.
In this situation, the three conscious agents have the property
that every pair is adjacent; we say that the graph of the three agents
is complete. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
So far we have considered joins that are undirected, in the
sense that if C1 sends a message to C2 then C2 sends a message
to C1. However, it is also possible for conscious agents to have
directed joins. This is illustrated in Figure 7. In this case, C1 sends
a message to C2 and receives a message from C3, but receives no
FIGURE 7 | Three conscious agents with directed joins. Here we
assume A1 = P2, A2 = P3, and A3 = P1.
FIGURE 8 | Simplified graph of three conscious agents with directed
joins.
message from C2 and sends no message to C3. Similar remarks
hold,mutatis mutandis, for C2 and C3.
Figure 7 can be simplified as shown in Figure 8.
Directed joins can model the standard situation in visual
perception, in which there are multiple levels of visual represen-
tations, one level building on others below it. For instance, at one
level there could be the construction of 2D motions based on a
solution to the correspondence problem; at the next level there
could be a computation of 3D structure from motion, based on
the 2D motions computed at the earlier level (Marr, 1982). So
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an agent C1 might solve the correspondence problem and pass its
solution to C2, which solves the structure-from-motion problem,
and then passes its solution to C3, which does object recognition.
We can join any number of conscious agents into any multi-
graph, where nodes denote agents and edges denote directed or
undirected joins between agents (Chartrand and Ping, 2012). The
nodes can have any finite degree, i.e., any finite number of edges.
As a special case, conscious agents can be joined to form deter-
ministic or non-deterministic cellular automata (Ceccherini-
Silberstein and Coornaert, 2010) and universal Turing machines
(Cook, 2004).
DYNAMICS OF TWO CONSCIOUS AGENTS
Two conscious agents
C1 = (X1,G1, P1,D1,A1,N1), (14)
and
C2 = (X2,G2, P2,D2,A2,N2), (15)
can be joined, as illustrated in Figure 2, to form a dynamical
system. Here we discuss basic properties of this dynamics.
The state space, E, of the dynamics is E = X1 × G1 × X2 × G2,
with product σ -algebra E. The idea is that for the current step,
t ∈ N, of the dynamics, the state can be described by the vec-
tor (x1(t), g1(t), x2(t), g2(t)), and based on this state four actions
happen simultaneously: (1) agent C1 experiences the perception
x1(t) ∈ X1 and decides, according to D1, on a specific action
g1(t) ∈ G1 to take at step t + 1; (2) agent C1, using A1, takes
the action g1(t) ∈ G1; (3) agent C2 experiences the perception
x2(t) ∈ X2 and decides, according to D2, on a specific action
g2(t) ∈ G2 to take at step t + 1; (4) agent C2, using A2, takes the
action g2(t) ∈ G2.
Thus, the state evolves by a kernel
L : E × E → [0, 1], (16)
which is given, for state e = (x1(t), g1(t), x2(t), g2(t)) ∈ E at time
t and event B ∈ E, comprised of a measurable set of states of the




A2(g2(t), dx1(t + 1))D1(x1(t), dg1(t + 1))A1(g1(t),
dx2(t + 1))D2(x2(t), dg2(t + 1)). (17)
This is not kernel composition; it is simply multiplication of the
four kernel values. The idea is that at each step of the dynamics
each of the four kernels acts simultaneously and independently of
the others to transition the state (x1(t), g1(t), x2(t), g2(t)) to the
next state (dx1(t + 1), dg1(t + 1), dx2(t + 1), dg2(t + 1)).
FIRST EXAMPLE OF ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
For concreteness, consider the simplest possible case where (1)
X1, G1, X2, and G2 each have only two states which, using Dirac
notation, we denote |0〉 and |1〉, and (2) each of the kernels A2,
D1, A1, and D2 is a 2 × 2 identity matrix.
There are total of 24 = 16 possible states for the dynamics of
the two agents, which we can write as |0000〉, |0001〉, |0010〉, . . .
|1111〉, where the leftmost digit is the state of X1, the next digit
the state of G1, the next of X2, and the rightmost of G2.
The asymptotic (i.e., long-term) dynamics of these two con-
scious agents can be characterized by its absorbing sets and their
periods. Recall that an absorbing set for such a dynamics is
a smallest set of states that acts like a roach motel: once the
dynamics enters the absorbing set it never leaves, and it forever
cycles periodically through the states within that absorbing set.
It is straightforward to verify that for the simple dynamics of
conscious agents just described, the asymptotic behavior is as
follows:
(1) {|0000〉} is absorbing with period 1;
(2) {|1111〉} is absorbing with period 1;
(3) {|0101〉, |1010〉} is absorbing with period 2;
(4) {|0001〉, |1000〉, |0100〉, |0010〉} is absorbing with period 4,
and cycles in that order;
(5) {|0011〉, |1001〉, |1100〉, |0110〉} is absorbing with period 4,
and cycles in that order;
(6) {|0111〉, |1011〉, |1101〉, |1110〉} is absorbing with period 4,
and cycles in that order.
SECOND EXAMPLE OF ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
If we alter this dynamics by simply changing the kernel D1 from
an identity matrix to the matrix D1 = ((0, 1), (1, 0)), then the
asymptotic behavior changes to the following:
(1) {|0000〉, |0100〉, |0110〉, |0111〉, |1111〉, |1011〉, |1001〉, |1000〉}
is absorbing with period 8, and cycles in that order;
(2) {|0001〉, |1100〉, |0010〉, |0101〉, |1110〉, |0011〉, |1101〉, |1010〉}
is absorbing with period 8, and cycles in that order.
If instead of changing D1 we changed D2 (or A1 or A2) to
((0,1),(1,0)), we would get the same asymptotic behavior. Thus,
in general, an asymptotic behavior corresponds to an equivalence
class of interacting conscious agents.
The range of possible dynamics of pairs of conscious agents
is huge, and grows as one increases the richness of the state
space E and, therefore, the set of possible kernels. The possibil-
ities increase as one considers dynamical systems of three or more
conscious agents, with all the possible directed and undirected
joins among them, forming countless connected multi-graphs or
amenable groups.
With this brief introduction to the dynamics of conscious
agents we are now in a position to state another key hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Conscious-agent thesis. Every property of con-
sciousness can be represented by some property of a dynamical
system of conscious agents.
THE COMBINATION PROBLEM
Conscious realism and the conscious-agent thesis are strong
claims, and face a tough challenge: Any theory that claims con-
sciousness is fundamental must solve the combination problem
(Seager, 1995; Goff, 2009; Blamauer, 2011; Coleman, 2014).
William Seager describes this as “the problem of explaining how
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the myriad elements of ‘atomic consciousness’ can be combined
into a new, complex and rich consciousness such as that we
possess” (Seager, 1995).
William James saw the problem back in 1890: “Where the ele-
mental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise
altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as
close together as you can (whatever that may mean); still each
remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, win-
dowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There
would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or
series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to
the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would
be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious
physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together;
but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with
them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or
(in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it. . . . The pri-
vate minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound mind”
(James, 1890/2007).
There are really two combination problems. The first is
the combination of phenomenal experiences, i.e., of qualia. For
instance, one’s taste experiences of salt, garlic, onion, basil and
tomato are somehow combined into the novel taste experience
of a delicious pasta sauce. What is the relationship between one’s
experiences of the ingredients and one’s experience of the sauce?
The second problem is the combination of subjects of expe-
riences. In the sauce example, a single subject experiences the
ingredients and the sauce, so the problem is to combine experi-
ences within a single subject. But how can we combine subjects
themselves to create a new unified subject? Each subject has its
point of view. How can different points of view be combined to
give a new, single, point of view?
No rigorous theory has been given for combining phenome-
nal experiences, but there is hope. Sam Coleman, for instance,
is optimistic but notes that “there will have to be some sort of
qualitative blending or pooling among the qualities carried by
each ultimate: if each ultimate’s quality showed up as such in the
macro-experience, it would lack the notable homogeneity of (e.g.,
color experience, and plausibly some mixing of basic qualities is
required to obtain the qualities of macro-experience” (Coleman,
2014).
Likewise, no rigorous theory has been given for combining
subjects. But here there is little hope. Thomas Nagel, for instance,
says “Presumably the components out of which a point of view
is constructed would not themselves have to have points of view”
(Nagel, 1979). Coleman goes further, saying, “it is impossible to
explain the generation of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms
of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, as I show, subjects cannot
combine” (Coleman, 2014).
So at present there is the hopeful, but unsolved, problem of
combining experiences and the hopeless problem of combining
subjects.
The theory of conscious agents provides two ways to combine
conscious agents: undirected combinations and directed combi-
nations. We prove this, and then consider the implications for
solving the problems of combining experiences and combining
subjects.
Theorem 1. (Undirected Join Theorem.) An undirected join of
two conscious agents creates a new conscious agent.
Proof . (By construction.) Let two conscious agents
C1 = ((X1,X1), (G1,G1), P1,D1,A1,N1), (18)
and
C2 = ((X2,X2), (G2,G2), P2,D2,A2,N2), (19)
have an undirected join. Let
C = ((X,X), (G,G), P,D,A,N)) (20)
where
X = X1 × X2, (21)
G = G1 × G2, (22)
P = P1 ⊗ P2 : GT × X → [0, 1], (23)
D = D1 ⊗ D2 : X × G → [0, 1], (24)
A = A1 ⊗ A2 : G × XT → [0, 1], (25)
N = N1 = N2, (26)
where superscript T indicates transpose, e.g., XT = X2 × X1;
where X is the σ -algebra generated by the Cartesian product of
X1and X2; where G is the σ -algebra generated by G1and G2; and
where the Markovian kernels P, D, and A are given explicitly, in
the discrete case, by
P((g2, g1), (x1, x2)) = P1 ⊗ P2((g2, g1), (x1, x2))
= P1(g2, x1)P2(g1, x2), (27)
D((x1, x2), (g1, g2)) = D1 ⊗ D2((x1, x2), (g1, g2))
= D1(x1, g1) D2(x2, g2), (28)
A((g1, g2), (x2, x1)) = A1 ⊗ A2((g1, g2), (x2, x1))
= A1(g1, x2) A2(g2, x1), (29)
where g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, x1 ∈ X1, and x2 ∈ X2. Then C satisfies
the definition of a conscious agent. 
Thus, the undirected join of two conscious agents (illustrated
in Figure 2) creates a single new conscious agent that we call
their undirected combination. It is straightforward to extend the
construction in Theorem 1 to the case in which more than
two conscious agents have an undirected join. In this case the
joined agents create a single new agent that is their undirected
combination.
Theorem 2. (Directed Join Theorem.) A directed join of two
conscious agents creates a new conscious agent.
Proof . (By construction.) Let two conscious agents
C1 = ((X1,X1), (G1,G1), P1,D1,A1,N1), (30)
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and
C2 = ((X2,X2), (G2,G2), P2,D2,A2,N2), (31)
have the directed join C1 → C2. Let
C = ((X,X), (G,G), P,D,A,N)) (32)
where
X = X1, (33)
G = G2, (34)
P = P1, (35)
D = D1A1D2 : X1 × G2 → [0, 1], (36)
A = A2, (37)
N = N1 = N2, (38)
where D1A1D2 denotes kernel composition. Then C satisfies the
definition of a conscious agent. 
Thus, the directed join of two conscious agents creates a single
new conscious agent that we call their directed combination. It is
straightforward to extend the construction in Theorem 2 to the
case in which more than one conscious agent has a directed join
to C2. In this case, all such agents, together with C2, create a new
agent that is their directed combination.
Given Theorems 1 and 2, we make the following
Conjecture 3: (Combination Conjecture.) Given any pseu-
dograph of conscious agents, with any mix of directed and
undirected edges, then any subset of conscious agents from the
pseudograph, adjacent to each other or not, can be combined to
create a new conscious agent.
How do these theorems address the problems of combining
experiences and subjects? We consider first the combination of
experiences.
Suppose C1 has a space of possible perceptual experiences X1,
and C2 has a space of possible perceptual experiences X2. Then
their undirected join creates a new conscious agent C that has
a space of possible perceptual experiences X = X1 × X2. In this
case, C has possible experiences that are not possible for C1 or
C2. If, for instance, C1 can see only achromatic brightness, and
C2 can see only variations in hue, then C can see hues of varying
brightness. Although C’s possible experiences X are the Cartesian
product of X1 and X2, nevertheless C might exhibit perceptual
dependence between X1 and X2, due to feedback inherent in an
undirected join (Maddox and Ashby, 1996; Ashby, 2000).
For a directed join C1 → C2, the directed-combination agent
C has a space of possible perceptual experiences X = X1. This
might suggest that no combination of experiences takes place.
However, C has a decision kernel D that is given by the kernel
product D1A1D2. This product integrates (in the literal sense of
integral calculus) over the entire space of perceptual experiences
X2, making these perceptual experiences an integral part of the
decision process. This comports well with evidence that there is
something it is like to make a decision (Nahmias et al., 2004;
Bayne and Levy, 2006), and suggests the intriguing possibility that
the phenomenology of decision making is intimately connected
with the spaces of perceptual experiences that are integrated in
the decision process. This is an interesting prediction of the for-
malism of conscious agents, and suggests that solution of the
combination problem for experience will necessarily involve the
integration of experience with decision-making.
We turn now to the combination of subjects. Coleman
describes subjects as follows: “The idea of being a subject goes
with being an experiential entity, something conscious of phe-
nomenal qualities. That a given subject has a particular phe-
nomenological point of view can be taken as saying that there
exists a discrete ‘sphere’ of conscious-experiential goings-on cor-
responding to this subject, with regard to which other subjects are
distinct in respect of the phenomenal qualities they experience,
and they have no direct (i.e., experiential) access to the qualitative
field enjoyed by the first subject. A subject, then, can be thought of
as a point of view annexed to a private qualitative field” (Coleman,
2014).
A conscious agent Ci is a subject in the sense described by
Coleman. It has a distinct sphere, Xi, of “conscious-experiential
goings-on” and has no direct experiential access to the sphere, Xj,
of experiences of any other conscious agent Cj. Moreover, a con-
scious agent is a subject in the further sense of being an agent, i.e.,
making decisions and taking actions on its own. Thus, according
to the theory being explored here a subject, a point of view, is a
six-tuple that satisfies the definition of a conscious agent.
The problem with combining subjects is, according to Goff,
that “It is never the case that the existence of a number (one or
more) of subjects of experience with certain phenomenal char-
acters a priori entails the existence of some other subject of
experience” (Goff, 2009).
Coleman goes further, saying that “The combination of sub-
jects is a demonstrably incoherent notion, not just one lacking in a
priori intelligibility . . . ” (Coleman, 2014). He explains why: “. . . a
set of points of view have nothing to contribute as such to a single,
unified successor point of view. Their essential property defines
them against it: in so far as they are points of view they are expe-
rientially distinct and isolated—they have different streams of
consciousness. The diversity of the subject-set, of course, derives
from the essential oneness of any given member: since each sub-
ject is essentially a oneness, a set of subjects are essentially diverse,
for they must be a set of onenesses. Essential unity from essential
diversity . . . is thus a case of emergence . . . ”
The theory of conscious agents proposes that a subject, a point
of view, is a six-tuple that satisfies the definition of conscious
agent. The directed and undirected join theorems give construc-
tive proofs of how conscious agents and, therefore, points of view,
can be combined to create a new conscious agent, and thus a
new point of view. The original agents, the original subjects, are
not destroyed in the creation of the new agent, the new sub-
ject. Instead the original subjects structurally contribute in an
understandable, indeed mathematically definable, fashion to the
structure and properties of the new agent. The original agents are,
indeed, influenced in the process, because they interact with each
other. But they retain their identities. And the new agent has new
properties not enjoyed by the constituent agents, but which are
intelligible from the structure and interactions of the constituent
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agents. In the case of undirected combination, for instance, we
have seen that the new agent can have periodic asymptotic prop-
erties that are not possessed by the constituent agents but that are
intelligible—and thus not emergent in a brute sense—from the
structures and interactions of the constituent agents.
Thus, in short, the theory of conscious agents provides the first
rigorous theoretical account of the combination of subjects. The
formalism is rich with deductive implications to be explored. The
discussion here is just a start. But one hint is the following. The
undirected combination of two conscious agents is a single con-
scious agent whose world,W, is itself. This appears to be a model
of introspection, in which introspection emerges, in an intelligible
fashion, from the combination of conscious agents.
MICROPHYSICAL OBJECTS
We have sketched a theory of subjects. Now we use it to sketch a
theory of objects, beginning with the microscopic and proceeding
to the macroscopic.
The idea is that space-time and objects are among the sym-
bols that conscious agents employ to represent the properties and
interactions of conscious agents. Because each agent is finite, but
the realm of interacting agents is infinite, the representations of
each agent, in terms of space-time and objects, must omit and
simplify. Hence the perceptions of each agent must serve as an
interface to that infinite realm, not as an isomorphic map.
Interacting conscious agents form dynamical systems, with
asymptotic (i.e., long-term) behaviors. We propose that micro-
physical objects represent asymptotic properties of the dynamics
of conscious agents, and that space-time is simply a convenient
framework for this representation. Specifically, we observe that
the harmonic functions of the space-time chain that is associated
with the dynamics of a system of conscious agents are identical to
the wave function of a free particle; particles are vibrations not of
strings but of interacting conscious agents.
Consider, for concreteness, the system of two conscious agents
of section Dynamics of Two Conscious Agents, whose dynam-
ics is governed by the kernel L of (17). This dynamics is clearly
Markovian, because the change in state depends only on the cur-
rent state. The space-time chain associated to L has, by definition,
the kernel
Q : (E × N) × (E ⊗ 2N) → [0, 1], (39)
given by
Q ((e, n), A × {m}) =
{
L (e, A) if m = n + 1,
0, otherwise,
(40)
where e ∈ E, n,m ∈ N, and A ∈ E (Revuz, 1984).
Then it is a theorem (Revuz, 1984) that, if Q is quasi-compact
(this is true when the state space is finite, as here), the asymptotic
dynamics of the Markov chain takes on a cyclical character:
• There are a finite number of invariant events or absorbing sets:
once the chain lands in any of these, it stays there forever. And
the union of these events exhausts the state space E. We will
index these events with the letter ρ.
• Each invariant event ρ is partitioned into a finite number dρof
“asymptotic” events, indexed by ρ and by δ = 1, . . ., dρ , so
that once the chain enters the asymptotic event δ, it will then
proceed, with certainty, to δ + 1, δ + 2, and so on, cyclically
around the set of asymptotic events for the invariant event ρ.
Then there is a correspondence between eigenfunctions of
L and harmonic functions of Q (Revuz, 1984, p. 210)
We let







where ρ is the index over the invariant events (i.e., absorbing sets),
the variable k is an integer modulo dρ , and Uρ,δ is the indicator
function of the asymptotic event with index ρ, δ. For instance,
in the example of section First Example of Asymptotic Behavior,
there are 6 absorbing sets, so ρ = 1, 2, . . . , 6. The first absorbing
set has only one state, so d1 = 1. Similarly, d2 = 1, d3 = 2, d4 =
d5 = d6 = 4. The functionU1,1 has the value 1 on the state |0000〉
and 0 for all other states; U5,3 has the value 1 on the state |1100〉
and 0 for all other states.
Then it is a theorem that
Lfρ,k = λρ,kfρ,k, (43)
i.e., that fρ,k is an eigenfunction of L with eigenvalue λρ,k, and
that
gρ,k(· , n) = (λρ,k)−nfρ,k, (44)
is Q-harmonic (Revuz, 1984). Then, using (41–42), we have
































where dρ,k = dρ/k. This is identical in form to the wavefunction
of the free particle (Allday, 2009, §7.2.3):
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This leads us to identify A 1, Uρ,δ |x〉, δ x, n t, and
dρ,k λ = T. Then the momentum of the particle is p = h/dρ,k
and its energy is E = hc/dρ,k, where h is Planck’s constant and c
is the speed of light.
Thus, we are identifying (1) a wavefunction ψ of the free par-
ticle with a harmonic function g of a space-time Markov chain
of interacting conscious agents, (2) the position basis |x〉 of the
particle with indicator functions Uρ,δ of asymptotic events of the
agent dynamics, (3) the position index x with the asymptotic state
index δ, (4) the time parameter t with the step parameter n, (5)
the wavelength λ and period T with the number of asymptotic
events dρ,k in the asymptotic behavior of the agents, and (6) the
momentum p and energy E as functions inversely proportional
to dρ,k.
Note that wavelength and period are identical here: in these
units, the speed of the wave is 1.
This identification is for non-relativistic particles. For the rel-
ativistic case we sketch a promising direction to explore, starting
with the dynamics of two conscious agents in an undirected join.
In this case, the state of the dynamics has six components: N1,
N2, X1, X2, G1, G2. We identify these with the generating vectors
of a geometric algebra (2, 4) (Doran and Lasenby, 2003). The
components N1 and N2 have positive signature, and the remain-
ing have negative signature. (2, 4) is the conformal geometric
algebra for a space-time with signature (1, 3), i.e., the Minkowski
space of special relativity. The conformal group includes as a
subgroup the Poincare group of space-time translations and rota-
tions; but the full conformal group is needed for most massless
relativistic theories, and appears in theories of supersymmetry
and supergravity. The Lie group SU(2, 2) is isomorphic to the
rotor group of (2, 4), which provides a connection to the
twistor program of Roger Penrose for quantum gravity (Penrose,
2004).
Thus, the idea is to construct a geometric algebra (2, 4) from
the dynamics of two conscious agents, and from this to con-
struct space-time and massless particles. Each time we take an
undirected join of two conscious agents, we get a new geometric
algebra (2, 4) with new basis vectors as described above. Thus,
we get a nested hierarchy of such geometric algebras from which
we can build space-time from the Planck scale up to macroscopic
scales. The metric would arise from the channel capacity of the
joined agents.
Themassive case involves symmetry breaking, and a promising
direction to explore here involves hierarchies of stopping times
in the Markovian dynamics of conscious agents. The idea is that
one system of conscious agents might infrequently interact with
another system, an interaction that can be modeled using stop-
ping times. Such interactions can create new conscious agents,
using the combination theorems presented earlier, whose “time”
is moving more slowly than that of the original systems of agents
involved in the combination. This hierarchy of stopping times
proceeds all the way up to the slow times of our own con-
scious experiences as human observers (roughly 1040 times slower
than the Planck time). The hierarchy of stopping times is linked
to a hierarchy of combinations of conscious agents, leading up
to the highest level of conscious agents that constitute us, and
beyond.
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
Here we summarize helpful feedback from readers of earlier
drafts, in the form of objections and replies.
(1) Your definition of conscious agents could equally well-apply
to unconscious agents. Thus, your theory says nothing about
consciousness.
Even if the definition could apply to unconscious agents, that
would not preclude it from applying to consciousness, any more
than using the integers to count apples would preclude using
them to count oranges.
(2) How can consciousness be cast in a mathematical formalism
without losing something essential?
The mathematics does lose something essential, viz., conscious-
ness itself. Similarly, mathematical models of weather also lose
something essential, viz., weather itself. A mathematical model of
hurricanes won’t create rain, and a mathematical model of con-
sciousness won’t create consciousness. The math is not the terri-
tory. But, properly constructed, mathematics reveals the structure
of the territory.
(3) Why do you represent qualia by a probability space X?
Probability spaces can be used, of course, to represent a diverse
range of content domains, from the outcomes of coin-flips to the
long-term behavior of equity markets. But this does not preclude
using probability spaces to represent qualia. A probability space is
not itself identical to qualia (or to coin flips or equity markets). To
propose that we represent the possible qualia of a conscious agent
by a probability space is to propose that qualia convey informa-
tion, since probability and information are (as Shannon showed)
transforms of each other. It is also to propose that qualia need
not, in general, exhibit other structures, such asmetrics or dimen-
sions. Now certain qualia spaces, such as the space of phenomenal
colors, do exhibit metrical and dimensional properties. These
properties are not precluded. They are allowed but not required.
All that is required is that we can meaningfully talk about the
information content of qualia.
The qualia X of a conscious agent C are private, in the sense
that no other conscious agent Ci can directly experience X.
Instead each Ci experiences its own qualia Xi. Thus, the qualia
X are “inside” the conscious agent C. The “outside” for C isW, or
more precisely,W-C.
(4) A conscious agent should have free will. Where is this mod-
eled in your definition?
The kernel D represents the free will choices of the conscious
agent C. For any particular quale x in X, the kernel D gives a prob-
ability measure on possible actions in the set G that the conscious
agent might choose to perform. We take this probability measure
to represent the free will choice of the conscious agent. Thus, we
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interpret the probabilities as objective probabilities, i.e., as rep-
resenting a true nondeterminism in nature. We are inclined to
interpret all the other probabilities as subjective, i.e., as reflections
of ignorance and degrees of belief.
(5) A conscious agent should have goals and goal-directed behav-
iors. Where are these modeled in your definition?
Goals and goal-directed behaviors are not in the definition of
conscious agent. This allows the possibility of goal-free conscious
agents, and reflects the view that goals are not a definitional prop-
erty of consciousness. However, since one can construct universal
Turing machines from dynamical systems of conscious agents,
it follows that one can create systems of conscious agents that
exhibit goal-directed behaviors. Goals experienced as conscious
desires can be represented as elements of a qualia space X.
(6) Your theory doesn’t reject object permanence, because con-
scious agents are the “objects” that give rise to our percep-
tions of size and shape, and those agents are permanent even
when we’re not looking.
Conscious realism proposes that conscious agents are there even
when one is not looking, and thus rejects solipsism. But it also
rejects object permanence, viz., the doctrine that 3D space and
physical objects exist when they are not perceived. To claim that
conscious agents exist unperceived differs from the claim that
unconscious objects and space-time exist unperceived.
(7) If our perceptions of space-time and objects don’t resem-
ble objective reality, if they’re just a species-specific interface,
then science is not possible.
The interface theory of perception poses no special problems for
science. The normal process of creating theories and testing pre-
dictions continues as always. A particularly simple theory, viz.,
that our perceptions resemble reality, happens to be false. Fine.
We can develop other theories of perception and reality, and test
them. Science always faces the problem, well-known to philoso-
phers of science, that no collection of data uniquely determines
the correct theory. But that makes science a creative and engaging
process.
(8) Your proposal that consciousness, rather than physics, is
fundamental places consciousness outside of science.
Absolutely not. The onus is on us to provide a mathematically
rigorous theory of consciousness, to show how current physics
falls out as a special case, and to make new testable predictions
beyond those of current physics. To dismiss the physicalist theory
that space-time and objects are fundamental is not to reject the
methodology of science. It is just to dismiss a specific theory that
is false.
(9) You argue that natural selection does not favor true per-
ceptions. But this entails that the reliability of our cognitive
faculties is low or inscrutable, and therefore constitutes a
defeater for belief in natural selection. See Alvin Plantinga’s
argument on this (Plantinga, 2002).
Evolutionary games and genetic algorithms demonstrate that nat-
ural selection does not, in general, favor true perceptions. But
this entails nothing about the reliability of our cognitive facul-
ties more generally. Indeed, selection pressures might favor more
accurate logic and mathematics, since these are critical for the
proper estimation of the fitness consequences of actions. The
selection pressures on each cognitive faculty must be studied
individually before conclusions about reliability are drawn.
(10) The undirected join of conscious agents doesn’t really solve
the problem of combining subjects, because the decision
kernel of the combination is just the product of the deci-
sion kernels of the two conscious agents that are combined.
This product only models two separate agents making sep-
arate decisions, not two subjects combined into a single
decision-making subject.
It’s true that the decision kernel, D, of the combination starts
out as a product, indicating independent decisions. But as the
conscious agents in the combination continue to interact, the
decisions become less and less independent. In the asymptotic
limit, the decision kernel Dn as n → ∞ of the combination
cannot, in general, be written as a product. In this limit, the
combination now has a single unified decision kernel, not decom-
posable as a product of the original decision kernels. And yet the
two conscious agents in the combination still retain their iden-
tities. Thus, the undirected join models a combination process
which starts off as little more than the product of the constituent
agents but ends up with those agents fully entangled to form a
new conscious agent with a genuinely new and integrated decision
kernel.
(11) If I have an objection it is that the authors’ proposal is maybe
not crazy enough. I amwith them 100%when they compare
neurons to icons on a computer screen. But (if I have under-
stood them correctly) they then go on to attribute absolute
existence to consciousness.My own inclination is to propose
that consciousness is also just an icon on a computer screen.
Conscious realism is the hypothesis that the objective world W
consists of conscious agents. The theory of conscious agents
is a mathematical theory of consciousness that quantifies over
qualia that it assumes really exist. So this theory does assume the
existence of consciousness.
However, it does not assume incorrigibility of qualia (to believe
one has a quale is to have one) or infallibility about the con-
tents of one’s consciousness. Psychophysical studies provide clear
evidence against incorrigibility and infallibility [see, e.g., the lit-
erature on change blindness (Simons and Rensink, 2005)]. Nor
does it assume that the mathematics of conscious agents is itself
identical to consciousness; a theory is just a theory.
One might try to interpret the theory of conscious agents as
describing a psychophysical monism, in which matter and con-
sciousness are two aspects of a more abstract reality. Such an
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interpretation, if possible, might still be unpalatable tomost phys-
icalists since it entails that dynamical physical properties, such as
position, momentum and spin, have definite values only when
they are observed.
(12) One problem with section Evolution and Perception is that
the authors never define either their notion of Truth, or their
notion of Perception. They seem to believe that if you startle
at any sound of rustling leaves (as a sort of sensitive predator
avoidance system), then when you run from a real predator,
you are not in any way in touch with the truth. But this is
incorrect.
For sake of brevity, we omitted our definitions of truth and per-
ception from this paper. But they are defined precisely in papers
that study the evolution of perception inMonte Carlo simulations
of evolutionary games and genetic algorithms (Mark et al., 2010;
Hoffman et al., 2013; Marion, 2013; Mark, 2013).
Briefly, we define a perceptual strategy as a measurable func-
tion (or, more generally, a Markovian kernel) p : W → X, where
W is a measurable space denoting the objective world and X is
a measurable space denoting an organism’s possible perceptions.
If X = W and p is an isomorphism that preserves all structures
on W, then p is a naïve realist perceptual strategy. If X ⊂ W and
p is structure preserving on this subset, then p is a strong critical
realist strategy. If X need not be a subset of W and p is structure
preserving, then p is a weak critical realist strategy. If X need not
be a subset of W and p need not be structure preserving, then p
is an interface strategy. These strategies form a nested hierarchy:
naïve realist strategies are a subset of strong critical realist, which
are a subset of weak critical realist, which are a subset of interface.
Naïve realist strategies see all and only the truth. Strong criti-
cal realist strategies see some, but in general not all, of the truth.
Weak critical realist strategies in general see none of the truth, but
the relationships among their perceptions genuinely reflect true
relationships in the structure of the objective world W. Interface
strategies in general see none of the truth, and none of the true
relationships in the structure of W. Thus, our mathematical for-
mulation of perceptual strategies allows a nuanced exploration of
the role of truth in perception.
We let these perceptual strategies compete in hundreds of
thousands of evolutionary games in hundreds of thousands of
randomly chosen worlds, and find that strategies which see some
or all of the truth have a pathetic tendency to go extinct when
competing against interface strategies that are tuned to fitness
rather than truth. The various truth strategies don’t even get a
chance to compete in the genetic algorithms, because they are not
fit enough even to get on the playing field.
Thus, natural selection favors interface strategies that are
tuned to fitness, rather than truth. If an organism with an
interface perceptual strategy perceives, say, a predatory lion, then
it really does perceive a lion in the same sense that someone
having a headache really does have a headache. However, this
does not entail that the objective world,W, contains an observer-
independent lion, any more than a blue rectangular icon on a
computer desktop entails that there is a blue rectangular file
in the computer. There is something in the objective world W
that triggers the organism to perceive a lion, but whatever that
something is, it almost surely doesn’t resemble a lion. A lion is
simply a species-specific adaptive symbol, not an insight into
objective reality.
(13) In section Evolution and Perception, the authors’ argument
seems to be:Argument 1: (1) Natural selection favors fitness
in perceptual systems. (2) Fitness is incompatible with truth.
(3) Therefore, natural selection favors perceptions that do
not see truth in whole or in part.
With some minor tweaking, Argument 1 can be made
valid. But premise 2 is completely implausible. If a tiger is
charging you with lunch on his mind, truth works in the
service of fitness. (The authors’ treatment here raises the
question of why we have perceptual systems at all and not
just kaleidoscope eyes. They never address this.)
The authors would object that premise 2 is too strong.
They don’t subscribe to premise 2, they would say. They
would perhaps hold out for Argument 2:
Argument 2: (1) Natural selection favors fitness in per-
ceptual systems. (2) Fitness need not always coincide with
truth. (3) Therefore, natural selection favors perceptions
that do not see truth in whole or in part.
But Argument 2 is not valid and not tweakable into a
valid argument. The conclusion is a lot stronger than the
premises.
Worse, any weaker premise doesn’t give the authors their
needed/wanted radical thesis: Perception is not about truth,
it is about having kids.Which they insist must be interpreted
as Perception is never about truth, but about having kids.
But this interpretation is obviously false. For one thing, if an
ancient ancestor of ours (call her, Ug) is successful in having
kids, she needs to know the truth: that she has kids! Why?
Because Ug needs to take care of them!
We do not use either argument. We simply use Monte Carlo sim-
ulations of evolutionary games and genetic algorithms to study
the evolution of perceptual strategies (as discussed in Objection
12). We find, empirically, that strategies tuned to truth almost
always go extinct, or never even arise, in hundreds of thousands
of randomly chosen worlds.
The key to understanding this finding is the distinction
between fitness and truth. If W denotes the objective world (i.e.,
the truth), O denotes an organism, S the state of that organ-
ism, and A an action of that organism, then one can describe
fitness as a function f : W × O × S × A → R. In other words,
fitness depends not only on the objective truth W, but also
on the organism, its state and the action. Thus, fitness and
truth are quite distinct. Only if the fitness function happens
to be a monotonic function of some structure in W, i.e., so
that truth and fitness happen to coincide, will natural selection
allow a truth strategy to survive. In the generic case, where truth
and fitness diverge, natural selection sends truth strategies to
extinction.
To phrase this as an argument of the kind given in the objection
we would have Argument 3: (1) Natural selection favors fitness
in perceptual systems. (2) Truth generically diverges from fitness.
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(3) Therefore, natural selection generically favors perceptions that
diverge from the truth.
The word generically here is a technical term. Some property
holds generically if it holds everywhere except on a set of measure
zero. So, for instance, the cartesian coordinates (x, y) of a point
in the plane generically have a non-zero y coordinate. Here we are
assuming an unbiased (i.e., uniform) measure on the plane, in
which the measure of a set is proportional to its area. Since the set
of points with a zero y coordinate is the x-axis line, and since lines
have no area, it follows that generically a point in the plane has
a non-zero y coordinate. Note, however, that there are infinitely
many points with a zero y coordinate, even though this property
is non-generic.
So our argument is that, for an appropriate unbiased measure,
fitness functions generically diverge from truth, and thus natural
selection generically favors perceptions that diverge from truth.
This does not entail the stronger conclusion that natural selec-
tion never favors truth. That conclusion is indeed stronger than
our premises and stronger than required for the interface theory
of perception. Perhaps H. sapiens is lucky and certain aspects of
our perceptual evolution has been shaped by a non-generic fit-
ness function that does not diverge from truth. In this case some
aspects of our perceptions might be shaped to accurately report
the truth, in the same sense that your lottery ticket might be the
winner. But the smart money would bet long odds against it.
That’s what non-generic means.
The account of the interface theory about Ug’s perception of
her kids is the same as the account in Objection 12 for the percep-
tion of lions. There are no public physical objects. Lions and kids
are nomore public and observer independent than are headaches.
Lions and kids (and space-time itself) are useful species-specific
perceptions that have been shaped by natural selection not to
report the truth but simply to guide adaptive behavior. We must
take them seriously, but it is a logical error to conclude that we
must take them literally.
Although our eyes do not report the truth, they are not
kaleidoscope eyes because they do report what matters: fitness.
(14) We see then that the authors are caught in version of the
Liar: Science shows that perception never cares about truth.
Let this statement be L. L is derived via perception. So is L
(together with its perceptual base) true or false? If it is one,
then it is the other. Contradiction.
This is not our argument. We claim that perception evolved by
natural selection. Call this statement E. Now E is indeed informed
by the results of experiments, and thus by our perceptions. We
observe, from evolutionary game theory, that one mathematical
prediction of E is that natural selection generically drives true per-
ceptions to extinction when they compete with perceptions tuned
to fitness.
Suppose E is true. Then our perceptions evolved by natural
selection. This logically entails that our perceptions are generi-
cally about fitness rather than truth. Is this a contradiction? Not
at all. It is a scientific hypothesis that makes testable predic-
tions. For instance, it predicts that (1) physical objects have no
causal powers and (2) physical objects have no dynamical physical
properties when they are not observed. These predictions are in
fact compatible with quantum theory, and are part of the standard
interpretation of quantum theory.
Suppose E is false. Then our perceptions did not evolve by nat-
ural selection. At present, science has no other theory on offer
for the development of our perceptual systems. So, in this case,
science cannot at present make an informed prediction about
whether our perceptions are true or not. But this is not a logical
contradiction.
So there is no liar paradox. And there’d better not be. Science
cannot be precluded a priori from questioning the veridicality
of the perceptions of H. sapiens, any more than it can be pre-
cluded from questioning the veridicality of the perceptions of
other species. David Marr, for instance, argues that “. . . it is
extremely unlikely that the fly has any explicit representation of
the visual world around him—no true conception of a surface, for
example, but just a few triggers and some specifically fly-centered
parameters . . . ” and that the fly’s perceptual information “. . . is
all very subjective” (Marr, 1982, p. 34). Science has no trouble
investigating the veridicality of the perceptions of other species
and concluding, e.g., in the case of the fly, that they fail to be
veridical. Its methods apply equally well to evaluating the veridi-
cality of the perceptions of H. sapiens (Koenderink et al., 2010;
Koenderink, 2011b, 2013).
(15) Section The Interface Theory of Perception fares no better.
Here they say Reality, we learned, departed in important
respects from some of our perceptions. This is true. But it
is true because other perceptions of ours won out because
they were true. E.g., the Earth is not a flat disk or plane.
Other perceptions indeed won out—not because they are true but
because they are adaptive in a wider range of contexts. Flat earth is
adequate for many everyday activities, but if one wants to circum-
navigate the earth by boat then a spherical earth is more adaptive.
If one wants to control satellites in orbit or navigate strategic sub-
marines then a spherical earth is inadequate and a more complex
model is required.
Perceived 3D space is simply a species-specific perceptual
interface, not an insight into objective reality; we have argued
for this on evolutionary grounds, and researchers in embod-
ied cognition have arrived at a similar conclusion (Laflaquiere
et al., 2013; Terekhov and O’Regan, 2013). Space as modeled in
physics extends perceived space via the action of groups, e.g., the
Euclidean group, Poincare group, or arbitrary differentiable coor-
dinate transformations (Singh and Hoffman, 2013). Any objects
embedded in space, including earth and its 3D shape, are thus
descriptions in a species-specific vocabulary, not insights into
objective reality.
(16) Also, I don’t understand their interface theory of percep-
tion. I not only take my icons seriously, but literally: they
are icons. I’m prepared to wager the farm on this: they are
indeed icons.
We would agree that icons are indeed icons. When I open my
eyes and see a red apple, that red apple is indeed an icon of my
perceptual interface. When I close my eyes that icon disappears; I
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see just a mottled gray field. Now some physicalists would like to
claim that even when my eyes are closed, an objective red apple
still exists, indeed the very red apple that triggered my perceptual
interface to have a red apple icon. It is this claim that is generically
incorrect, if our perceptual systems evolved by natural selection.
(17) The authors make too much of the Humean idea that the
appearance of cause and effect is simply a useful fiction
(section The Interface Theory of Perception). They like all
mammals and perhaps most animals cannot fail to see cau-
sation in the deepest aspects of their lives. The authors
believe in causation as deeply as anyone in the world. Why?
Because we are all hardwired to see causation. And while it is
true that causation goes away at the quantum level, we have
no reason to believe that it doesn’t really exist at the macro
level. These two levels don’t live well together, but pretend-
ing that there’s no such thing as causation is silly, at least it
is silly without a lot of argument. Even Hume admitted that
causation was perfectly real when he had left his study and
went to play backgammon with his friends.
There is indeed good evidence that belief in causation is either
innate or learned early in life (Carey, 2009; Keil, 2011). And of
course we, the authors, are no exception; we, no less than oth-
ers, have a psychological penchant toward causal reasoning about
the physical world. But, equally, we no less than others have a
psychological penchant toward assuming that space, time and
physical objects are not merely icons of a species-specific percep-
tual interface, but are instead real insights into the true nature
of objective reality. Science has a habit of correcting our pen-
chants, even those deeply held. Evolutionary games and genetic
algorithms convinced us, against our deeply held convictions to
the contrary, that perceptions are, almost surely, interfaces not
insights; they also convinced us that the appearance of causality
among physical objects is a useful fiction.
Perceptual icons do, we propose, inform the behavior of the
perceiver, and in this sense might be claimed to have causal pow-
ers. This sense of causality, however, differs from that typically
attributed to physical objects.
Hume’s ideas on causation had little influence on us, in part
because exegesis of his ideas is controversial, including projec-
tivist, reductionist and realist interpretations (Garrett, 2009).
Our views on causality are consistent with interpretations of
quantum theory that abandon microphysical causality, such as
the Copenhagen, quantum Bayesian and (arguably) many-worlds
interpretations, (Allday, 2009; Fuchs, 2010; Tegmark, 2014). The
burden of proof is surely on one who would abandon microphys-
ical causation but still cling to macrophysical causation.
(18) Their treatment of the combination problem is worth read-
ing. There is however a very large problem with their model:
It relies on the Cartesian product of X1 and X2 (this is right
after Conjecture 3). The Cartesian product is not conducive
to real combination (this problem is all over mathematics,
by the way—mathematicians don’t care about it because
they only care about high level abstractions). In section
Objections and Replies, where they discuss objections to
their model, they discuss this very objection (objection 10).
Unfortunately, their resolution to this objection is mere
handwaving: But as the conscious agents in the combination
continue to interact, the decisions become less and less inde-
pendent. This is mere wishful thinking. The authors have no
reason to believe this less and less business and they’ve given
the reader no reason to think this either. In fact, if this less
and less business were true, their model wouldn’t require the
Cartesian product in the first place. Frankly, this objection
and their failure to handle it guts their model. In this same
paragraph, in the next couple of sentences, the authors just
assert (using proof by blatant assertion) that in some unde-
fined limit, a true new conscious entity emerges. This makes
the complex presentation of their model otiose. Why not
just write a haiku asserting that the combination problem
is not a problem?
The limit we speak of (for the emergence of a new combined
conscious agent) is the asymptotic limit. Asymptotic behavior
is a precise technical concept in the theory of Markov chains
(see, e.g., Revuz, 1984, chapter 6). We have given, in sections
First Example of Asymptotic Behavior and Second Example of
Asymptotic Behavior, concrete examples of undirected joins for
which, asymptotically, a new combined conscious agent is created
that is not just a Cartesian product of the original agents.
Intuitively, the reason that the undirected combination of two
agents creates a new agent that is not just a product is that there is
feedback between the two agents (this is illustrated in Figure 2).
Thus, the decisions and actions of one agent influence those of
the other. This influence is not fully felt in the first step of the
dynamics, but in the asymptotic limit of the dynamics it com-
pletely dominates, carving the state space of the dynamics into
various absorbing sets with their own periodic behaviors, in a
fashion that is not reducible to a simple product of the original
two agents.
The degree to which the new conscious agent is not reducible
to a simple product of the original agents can be precisely quan-
tified using, for instance, the measure of integrated information
developed by Tononi and others (Tononi and Edelman, 1998;
Tononi and Spoorns, 2003; Tononi, 2008; Tononi and Koch, 2008;
Barrett and Seth, 2011). It is straightforward to compute, for
instance, that the new agent in Second Example of Asymptotic
Behavior has 2 bits of integrated information, i.e., of new infor-
mation that is not reducible to that of the two original agents.
Thus, there is a precise and quantifiable sense in which the undi-
rected combination of conscious agents creates a new conscious
agent with its own new information.
We should note, however, that our use here of Tononi’s mea-
sure of integrated information does not imply that we endorse
his theory of consciousness. Tononi is a reductive functionalist,
proposing that consciousness is identical to integrated infor-
mation and that qualia are identical to specific informational
relationships (Tononi, 2008). Consistent with this view he asserts,
for instance, that spectrum inversion is impossible (Tononi, 2008,
footnote 8). However, a recent theorem proves that all reductive
functionalist theories of consciousness are false (Hoffman, 2006).
A fortiori, Tononi’s theory is false. His measure of integrated
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information and his analyses of informational relationships are
valuable. But his next move, of identifying consciousness with
integrated information, is provably false. He could fix this by
making the weaker claim that consciousness is caused by or results
from integrated information. His theory would no longer be nec-
essarily false. But then he would need to offer a scientific theory
about how integrated information causes or gives rise to con-
sciousness. No such theory is currently on offer and, we suspect,
no such theory is possible.
(19) The paper explicitly commits a fallacy: it privileges the
authors’ take on reality while denying that there is any such
thing as reality. For example: The authors say “There are no
public physical objects. Lions and kids are no more pub-
lic and observer independent than are headaches. Lions and
kids (and space-time itself) are useful species-specific per-
ceptions that have been shaped by natural selection not to
report the truth but simply to guide adaptive behavior. We
must take them seriously, but it is a logical error to conclude
that we must take them literally.”
Natural selection, which the authors clearly think is the
truth, is just as susceptible to their arguments as headaches
or truth itself. So by their own reasoning, natural selection
is not true; neither are their computer programs/models.
So the reader doesn’t have to take natural selection or their
models either seriously or literally. So their paper is now
exposed as self-refuting.
If we indeed proposed a “take on reality while denying that there
is any such thing as reality,” we would of course be self-refuting.
However, we do not deny that there is any such thing as real-
ity. We cheerfully admit that there is a reality. We simply inquire
into the relationship between reality and the perceptions of a
particular species, H. sapiens. Such inquiry is surely within the
purview of science. Moreover all currently accepted theories in
science, including evolutionary theory, are appropriate tools for
such inquiry.
We find that evolutionary theory entails a low probability that
our perceptions are veridical, and thus a high probability that
reality is not isomorphic to our perceptions, e.g., of spacetime and
objects. This prompts us to propose a new theory of reality, which
we have done by defining conscious agents and proposing con-
scious realism, viz., that reality consists of interacting conscious
agents.
This proposal invites us to revisit evolutionary theory itself.
The standard formulation of evolutionary theory, i.e., the neo-
Darwinian synthesis, is couched in terms of spacetime and objects
(such as organisms and genes), which we now take to be a species-
specific perceptual representation, not an insight into reality. But
we are not forced into self-refutation at this point. It is open to
us to formulate a new generalized theory of evolution that oper-
ates on what we now take to be reality, viz., interacting systems of
conscious agents.
A key constraint on our new evolutionary theory is this: When
the new evolutionary theory is projected onto the spacetime
perceptual interface of H. sapiens we must get back the stan-
dard evolutionary theory. Thus, we do not take the standard
evolutionary theory to be true, but instead to be a “boundary con-
dition” on the new evolutionary theory. Standard evolutionary
theory is simply how the new evolutionary theory appears when
it is shoehorned into the perceptual framework that H. sapiens
happens to have.
The process we are describing here is standard procedure in
science. We always use our current best theory as a ladder to a bet-
ter theory, whereupon we can, if necessary, kick away the ladder.
However, we needn’t take our best theory to be true. It’s simply
the best ladder we have to our next theory. We are here adopting
a philosophy of instrumentalism in regards to scientific theories.
The development of a new generalized theory of evolution is
not just an abstract possibility, but is in fact one of our current
projects. We are investigating the possibility of keeping the core
ideas of standard evolutionary theory that are sometimes referred
to as “Universal Darwinism,” ideas that include abstract notions
of variation, selection and retention. We plan to apply Universal
Darwinism to interacting systems of conscious agents to model
their evolution.
The new limited resource that is the source of competition
would be information, which is the measure we use to quantify
the channel capacity of conscious agents. This is a promising
direction, since information is equivalent to energy, and informa-
tion can be converted into energy (Toyabe et al., 2010). Limited
energy resources, e.g., in the form of food, are a clear source of
competition in standard evolutionary theory.
The new evolutionary theory that we construct should explain
why the standard evolutionary theory was a good ladder to the
new theory, and why we are justified in kicking away that ladder.
(20) The authors say, “In short, natural selection does not favor
perceptual systems that see the truth in whole or in part.
Instead, it favors perceptions that are fast, cheap, and tai-
lored to guide behaviors needed to survive and reproduce.
Perception is not about truth, it’s about having kids.” This is
a false dichotomy.
The distinction between truth and fitness, between truth and
having more kids, is not a false dichotomy to evolutionary biol-
ogists. It is a distinction that is central to their theory. The same
objectively true world can have an infinite variety of different fit-
ness functions, corresponding to the variety of organisms, states
and actions. A steak that conveys substantial fitness benefits to
a hungry lion conveys no benefits to a cow. Each distinct fitness
function drives natural selection in a different direction.
(21) In response to the claim that “Your definition of conscious
agents could equally well-apply to unconscious agents; thus,
your theory says nothing about consciousness.” the authors
reply that “Even if the definition could apply to unconscious
agents, that would not preclude it from applying to con-
sciousness, any more than using the integers to count apples
would preclude using them to count oranges.”
However, the very fact that the integers can be used to
count apples and oranges and peace treaties, etc., is pre-
cisely WHY the integers are not a theory of either apples or
oranges or peace treaties, etc. The same is true of definitions.
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If my definition of integer applies equally well to the com-
plex numbers as well as to the integers, then I do not have
a definition of integers. Instead I have a definition of com-
plex numbers. So their definition is useless; all they’ve done
is define an agent. Consciousness is not present, except
accidentally.
The integers are not considered a theory of peace treaties because
they don’t have the appropriate mathematical structure to model
peace treaties—not because they can be used to count apples and
peace treaties.
If one has a mathematical structure that is rich enough to pro-
vide a useful theory of some subject, this does not entail that
the same structure cannot be a useful theory of a different sub-
ject. The group SU(3), for instance, models an exact symmetry of
quark colors and an approximate symmetry of flavors. No physi-
cist would insist that because SU(3) is a useful theory of quark
color it cannot also be a useful theory of flavor. A givenMarkovian
kernel P can model a stochastic dynamics, but also a communica-
tion channel. The fact that P applies to both does not entail that
it’s a theory of neither.
Similarly, a measurable space X might properly represent the
conscious color experiences of a human observer, and also the
unconscious color judgments of a robotic vision system designed
to mimic that observer. No vision scientist would insist that
because X properly represents the unconscious color judgments
of the robotic vision system that therefore X cannot model the
conscious color experiences of the human observer.
Scientists do not reject a model because it has multiple
domains of useful application. They do reject a model if its struc-
ture is inappropriate to the domain, or if it makes predictions
that are empirically false. These are the appropriate grounds to
judge whether the formalism of conscious agents provides an
adequate model for consciousness. The possibility that this for-
malism applies well to other domains does not entail that it
cannot apply to consciousness.
CONCLUSION
Belief in object permanence commences at 3 months of age and
continues for a lifetime. It inclines us to assume that objects exist
without subjects to perceive them, and therefore that an account
of objects can be given without a prior account of subjects.
However, studies with evolutionary games and genetic algo-
rithms indicate that selection does not favor veridical perceptions,
and that therefore the objects of our perceptual experiences are
better understood as icons of a species-specific interface rather
than as an insight into the objective structure of reality. This
requires a fundamental reformulation of the theoretical frame-
work for understanding objects.
This reformulation cannot assume that physical objects have
genuine causal powers, nor that space-time is fundamental, since
objects and space-time are simply species-specific perceptual
adaptions.
If we assume that conscious subjects, rather than unconscious
objects, are fundamental, then wemust give amathematically pre-
cise theory of such subjects, and show how objects, and indeed
all physics, emerges from the theory of conscious subjects. This
is, of course, a tall order. We have taken some first steps by
(1) proposing the formalism of conscious agents, (2) using that
formalism to find solutions to the combination problem of con-
sciousness, and (3) sketching how the asymptotic dynamics of
conscious agents might lead to particles and space-time itself.
Much work remains to flesh out this account. But if it succeeds,
H. sapiens might just replace object permanence with objects of
consciousness.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For helpful discussions and comments on previous drafts we
thank Marcus Appleby, Wolfgang Baer, Deepak Chopra, Federico
Faggin, Pete Foley, Stuart Hameroff, David Hoffman, Menas
Kafatos, Joachim Keppler, Brian Marion, Justin Mark, Jeanric
Meller, Julia Mossbridge, Darren Peshek, Manish Singh, Kyle
Stephens, and an anonymous reviewer.
REFERENCES
Allday, J. (2009). Quantum Reality: Theory and Philosophy. Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press.
Ashby, F. G. (2000). A stochastic version of general recognition theory. J. Math.
Psychol. 44, 310–329. doi: 10.1006/jmps.1998.1249
Athreya, K. B., and Lahiri, S. N. (2006). Measure Theory and Probability Theory.
New York, NY: Springer.
Baillargeon, R., and DeVos, J. (1991). Object permanence in young infants: further
evidence. Child Dev. 62, 1227–1246. doi: 10.2307/1130803
Bargh, J. A., and Morsella, E. (2008). The unconscious mind. Perspect. Psychol. Sci.
3, 73–79. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x
Barrett, A. B., and Seth, A. K. (2011). Practical measures of integrated information
for time-series data. PLoS Comput. Biol. 7:1. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001052
Bayne, T., and Levy, N. (2006). “The feeling of doing: deconstructing the phe-
nomenology of agency,” in Disorders of Volition, eds N. Sebanz and W. Prinz
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 49–68.
Blackmore, S. (1999). The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blamauer, M. (2011). Is the panpsychist better off as an idealist? Some Leibnizian
remarks on consciousness and composition. Eidos 15, 48–75.
Boswell, J., (1986). The Life of Samuel Johnson, ed H. Christopher (New York, NY:
Penguin Classics), 122.
Bower, T. G. R. (1974). Development in Infancy. San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
Byrne, A., and Hilbert, D. R. (2003). Color realism and color science. Behav. Brain
Sci. 26, 3–26. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X03000013
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367638.001.0001
Ceccherini-Silberstein, T., and Coornaert, M. (2010). Cellular Automata and
Groups. Berlin: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-14034-1
Chartrand, G., and Ping, Z. (2012). A First Course in Graph Theory. Mineola, NY:
Dover.
Coleman, S. (2014). The real combination problem: panpsychism, micro-subjects,
and emergence. Erkenntnis 79, 19–44. doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x
Cook, M. (2004). Universality in elementary cellular automata. Complex Syst.
15, 1–40.
Cover, T. M., and Thomas, J. A. (2006). Elements of Information Theory. New York,
NY: Wiley.
Coyne, J. A. (2009).Why Evolution is True. New York, NY: Viking.
Crick, F. (1994). The Astonishing Hypothesis: the Scientific Search for the Soul. New
York, NY: Scribners.
Dawkins, R. (2009). The Greatest Show on Earth: the Evidence for Evolution. New
York, NY: Free Press.
Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. New York, NY: Touchstone.
Doran, C., and Lasenby, A. (2003). Geometric Algebra for Physicists. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511807497
Edelman, G. M. (2004). Wider than the Sky: the Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Feldman, J. (2013). Tuning your priors to the world. Top. Cogn. Sci. 5, 13–34. doi:
10.1111/tops.12003
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 577 | 20
Hoffman and Prakash Objects of consciousness
Fodor, J., and Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (2010).What Darwin gotWrong, Farrar, Straus
and Giroux. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Fuchs, C. (2010). QBism, the Perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism. Available online
at: arXiv:1003.5209v51.
Futuyma, D. J. (2010). Two critics without a clue. Science 328, 692–693. doi:
10.1126/science.1189090
Garrett, D. (2009). “Hume,” in The Oxford Handbook of Causation, eds H. Beebee,
C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 53–71.
Geisler, W. S., and Diehl, R. L. (2003). A Bayesian approach to the evo-
lution of perceptual and cognitive systems. Cogn. Sci. 27, 379–402. doi:
10.1207/s15516709cog2703_3
Geisler, W. W., and Diehl, R. L. (2002). Bayesian natural selection and the
evolution of perceptual systems. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 357, 419–448. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2001.1055
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, MA:
Houghton Mifflin.
Goff, P. (2009). Why panpsychism doesn’t help us explain consciousness.Dialectica
63, 289–311. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01196.x
Hameroff, S. R. (1998). Quantum computation in brain microtubules? The
Penrose-Hameroff “Orch OR” model of consciousness”. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
A 356, 1869–1896. doi: 10.1098/rsta.1998.0254
Herken, R. (ed.). (1988). The Universal Turing Machine: a Half-century Survey.New
York, NY: Springer.
Hoffman, D. D. (1998). Visual Intelligence: HowWe Create What We See. New York,
NY: W. W. Norton.
Hoffman, D. D. (2006). The scrambling theorem: a simple proof of the log-
ical possibility of spectrum inversion. Conscious. Cogn. 15, 31–45. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2005.06.002
Hoffman, D. D. (2009). “The interface theory of perception,” in Object
Categorization: Computer and Human Vision Perspectives, eds S. Dickinson, M.
Tarr, A. Leonardis, and B. Schiele (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press),
148–165. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511635465.009
Hoffman, D. D. (2011). “The construction of visual reality,” in Hallucinations:
Theory and Practice, eds J. Blom and I. Sommer (New York, NY:
Springer), 7–15.
Hoffman, D. D. (2012). “The sensory desktop,” in This Will Make You Smarter: New
Scientific Concepts to Improve Your Thinking, ed J. Brockman (New York, NY:
Harper Perennial), 135–138.
Hoffman, D. D. (2013). “Public objects and private qualia: the scope and lim-
its of psychophysics,” in The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Experimental
Phenomenology, ed L. Albertazzi (New York, NY: Wiley-Blackwell),
71–89.
Hoffman, D. D., and Singh, M. (2012). Computational evolutionary perception.
Perception 41, 1073–1091. doi: 10.1068/p7275
Hoffman, D. D., Singh, M., and Mark, J. T. (2013). “Does natural selection favor
true perceptions,” in Proceedings of the SPIE (Bellingham, WA).
Hopcroft, J. E., Motwani, R., and Ullman, J. D. (2006). Introduction to Automata
Theory, Languages, and Computation, 3rd Edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology, Vols 1, 2. London: MacMillan. doi:
10.1037/10538-000
James, W., (1890/2007). The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, New York, NY: Cosimo.
Keil, F.C. (2011). Science starts early. Science 33, 1022–1023. doi: 10.1126/sci-
ence.1195221
Knill, D., and Richards, W. A. (eds.). (1996). Perception as Bayesian Inference. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511984037
Koenderink, J. J. (2011a). “Vision and information,” in Perception Beyond Inference:
The Information Content of Visual Processes, eds L. Albertazzi, G. Tonder, and D.
Vishnawath (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 27–58.
Koenderink, J. J. (2011b). “Vision as a user interface,” in Proceedings of SPIE, Human
Vision and Electronic Imaging XVI,Vol. 7865 (Bellingham,WA). doi: 10.1117/12.
881671
Koenderink, J. J. (2013). “World, environment, umwelt, and inner-world: a biolog-
ical perspective on visual awareness,” in Proceedings of SPIE, Human Vision and
Electronic Imaging XVIII, Vol. 8651 (Bellingham, WA). doi: 10.1117/12.2011874
Koenderink, J. J., van Doorn, A., de Ridder, H., and Oomes, S. (2010). Visual rays
are parallel. Perception 39, 1163–1171. doi: 10.1068/p6530
Laflaquiere, A., Terekhov, A. V., Gas, B., and O’Regan, K. O. (2013).
“Learning an internal representation of the end-effector configuration
space,” in IEEE Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (Tokyo),
1230–1235.
Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., and Nowak, M. A. (2005). Evolutionary dynamics on
graphs. Nature 433, 312–316. doi: 10.1038/nature03204
Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: Tho Basset.
Maddox, W. T. S., and Ashby, F. G. (1996). Perceptual separability, decisional
separability, and the identification-speeded classification relationship. J. Exp.
Psychol. 22, 795–817.
Marion, B. B. (2013). The Impact of Utility on the Evolution of Perceptions. Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, CA.
Mark, J. T. (2013). Evolutionary Pressures on Perception: When does Natural Selection
Favor Truth? Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, CA.
Mark, J. T., Marion, B. B., and Hoffman, D. D. (2010). Natural selection and veridi-
cal perceptions. J. Theor. Biol. 266, 504–515. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.020
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: a Computational Investigation into the Human
Representation and Processing of Visual Information. San Francisco, CA:
Freeman.
Mausfeld, R. (2002). “The physicalist trap in perception theory,” in Perception and
the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception, eds D.
Heyer and R. Mausfeld (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons), 75–112.
McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem?Mind 98, 349–366. doi:
10.1093/mind/XCVIII.391.349
Mitchell, M. (1998). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. Cambridge, MA:
Bradford Books MIT Press.
Nagel, T. (ed.). (1979). “Panpsychism,” in Mortal Questions (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press), 181–195.
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., and Turner, J. (2004). The phenomenology
of free will. J. Conscious. Stud. 11, 162–179.
Nowak, M. (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Pais, A. (1979). Einstein and the quantum theory. Rev. Mod. Phys. 51, 863–914.
(Quote on p. 907). doi: 10.1103/RevModPhys.51.863
Palmer, S. E. (1999). Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Penrose, R. (2004). The Road to Reality, New York, NY: Knopf.
Piaget, J. (1954). The Construction of Reality in the Child. New York, NY: Basic. doi:
10.1037/11168-000
Plantinga, A. (2002). Naturalism Defeated? Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Revuz, D. (1984).Markov Chains, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Rutherford, E. (1911). The scattering of α and β particle bymatter and the structure
of the atom. Philos. Mag. 6, 21.
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information, and panpsychism. J. Conscious.
Stud. 2, 272–288.
Simons, D. J., and Rensink, R. A. (2005). Change blindness: past, present, and
future. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 16–23. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.11.006
Singh, M., and Hoffman, D. D. (2013). “Natural selection and shape percep-
tion: shape as an effective code for fitness,” in Shape Perception in Human and
Computer Vision: an Interdisciplinary Perspective, eds S. Dickinson and Z. Pizlo
(New York, NY: Springer), 171–185.
Taylor, C. C. W. (1999). “The atomists,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early
Greek Philosophy, ed A. A. Long (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press),
181–204. doi: 10.1017/CCOL0521441226.009
Tegmark, M. (2014). Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature
of Reality. New York, NY: Knopf.
Terekhov, A., and O’Regan, K.O. (2013). Space as an Invention of Biological Systems.
Available online at: arxiv.org/abs/1308.2124.
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC
Neurosci. 5:42. doi: 10.1186/1471-2202-5-42
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional mani-
festo. Biol. Bull. 215, 216–242. doi: 10.2307/25470707
Tononi, G., and Edelman, G. (1998). Consciousness and complexity. Science 282,
1846–1851. doi: 10.1126/science.282.5395.1846
Tononi, G., and Koch, C. (2008). The neural correlates of consciousness: an update.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1124, 239–261. doi: 10.1196/annals.1440.004
Tononi, G., and Spoorns, O. (2003). Measuring information integration. BMC
Neurosci. 4:31. doi: 10.1186/1471-2202-4-31
Toyabe, S., Sagawa, T., Ueda, M., Muneyuki, E., and Sano, M. (2010). Experimental
demonstration of information-to-energy conversion and validation of the gen-
eralized Jarzynski equality. Nat. Phys. 6, 988–992. doi: 10.1038/nphys1821
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 577 | 21
Hoffman and Prakash Objects of consciousness
Turing, A.M. (1937). On computable numbers, with an application to the
Entscheidungs problem. Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. 2, 42, 230–265. doi:
10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230
Wilczek, F. (2006). Fantastic Realities: 49 Mind Journeys and a Trip to Stockholm.
Singapore: World Scientific.
Yuille, A., and Bülthoff, H. (1996). “Bayesian decision theory and psychophysics,”
in Perception as Bayesian inference, eds D. Knill and W. Richards (New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press), 123–162.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 22 January 2014; accepted: 23 May 2014; published online: 17 June 2014.
Citation: Hoffman DD and Prakash C (2014) Objects of consciousness. Front. Psychol.
5:577. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577
This article was submitted to Perception Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Hoffman and Prakash. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publica-
tion in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 577 | 22
